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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEGRANDE Le BELNAP
Appellant
Case No. 18649

VSo

WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, in its corporate
capacity
Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable
Bryant Ho Croft, denying the plaintiff judgment upon his complaint against the defendant seeking to quiet title to properties situated in Salt Lake County; and from the same
Order granting the defendant declaratory relief, pursuant
with the prayer of defendant's counterclaim, declaring that
the defendant had a good and valid mortgage against the property which is the subject of this action.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, entered his order
denying the relief sought by the plaintiff in his case in
chief, which action was brought for the purpose of quieting
title to the subject property in the plaintiff and declaring
that the defendant had no interest in the same.,

At the
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same time, the Honorable Judge Croft granted defendant's
motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim for declaratory relief, which judgment effectively disposed of
the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff contends that the District Court erred
in denying him the relief sought and in granting the
defendant declaratory relief.

The plaintiff seeks an Order

of this Court reversing the judgment of the District Court,
since the same is based upon a complaint for declaratory
relief ,_.,hich does not comply with statute; and for a further
order of this Court remanding this case to the District
Court with the direction that the District Court enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
for the reason that defendants claim to a lien interest in
real property is based upon a written instrument which is
void; or failing the aforementioned relief,

for an order

directing that the judgment be reversed and the case sent
back for trial of all issues raised by plaintiff's complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The plaintiff's father and mother deeded real

property to the plaintiff by Warranty Deed dated August, 1951,
( Suppl.emen tal Record pp. 1) .

2e

Said real property was situated in Salt Lake

County and located at 1466 Indian Hills Drive,
record

pp. ·l)

(Supplemental

c
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3.

Plaintiff and plaintiff's wife erected a

home on said property and had resided there continuously
until the death of plaintiff's wife in 1972; and plaintiff
has continued to reside in said property since hPr death
(Deposition of LeGrande Le Belnap, Record pp 585,
0

(deposition

page 20) .
4c

The deed conveying said property to the

plaintiff was delivered to the defendant and made part of
an application by the plaintiff and plaintiff's wife-for a
mortgage on

th~.

subject property.

(Affidavit of LeGrande

L. Belnap, Record PPc 164-165).
5.

Without the knowledge and consent of the

plaintiff, the defendant took delivery of a second deed of
the same property proportedly conveyir.g said property exclusively to plaintiff's wife.

Said deed dated November

10, 1952 was forged as to the signature of plaintiff's
mother and the signature of plaintiff's father is still factually in dispute.

(Affidavit of LeGrande L. Belnap, Record

pp. 164-165; Deposition of Ben Garcia, Record p. 586; deposition
page 24, lines 1-10 page 25, lines 1-9, page 26 lines g,_g;
Affidavit of Wilford W. Kimball, record pp. 80-81; Affidavit
of Henry Belnap, Record pp. 14-15; Record page 768,deposition
pp. 6, 9-10; Affidavit of Leslie W. King, transcript pp.
182-183)

0

6.

The circumstances in the execution and delivery

of the deed dated November 10, 1952 is in dispute.

peposition

of Henry Belnap, record page 768 deposition pp. 6, 9-10;
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Affidavit of Henry Belnap, Record pp. 14-15).
7.

The defendant required the plaintiff to

execute a mortgage with warranties of title that he had
title to the subject property even though the defendant
recorded the forged deed concurrent with the recordation of
said mortgage; and even though the defendant retained the
original conveyance of August, 1951, conveying said property
to the plaintiff and his wife.

(Affidavit of Wilford W.

Kimball, Record pp. 80-81).
8.

Both deeds were in the possession and control

of the defendant at all times prior to the initiation of
this action, at which time they were deposited with the Clerk
of the Court.

(Deposition of Stephen L. Goalen, Record

pp. 769 deposition page 9 lines 8-25, page 10 lines 1-10).
9_

In 1964, without the knowledge of the plaintiff,

the defendant recorded a trust deed on said
by plaintiff's wife.

property executed

(Affidavit of Wilford W. Kimball

Record pp. 80-81).
10.

Plainitff's wife died in 1972 and a probate

action was brought to the Third District Court.
pp.

(Record

653-655).
11.

The defendant was appointed the special

administratior and the administrator of the estate of plaintiff
wife 1 and the defendant has received a final discharge from
its duties as the administrator of the estate of plaintiff's
wife.

(Record pp. 656-658; Record

pp. 712; Record pp 714-715).
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12°

Subsequent to the death of the plaintiff's

wife, the plaintiff brought this action against the
defendant, seeking to quiet title to the property, which
is the subject of ~laintiff 's complainto

130

(Record ppo 2-3)

0

The defendant filed its answer and counter-

claim seeking declaratory relief pursuant with the statutes
of the State of Utaho

140

(Record ppo 6-9)

0

In its answer and counterclaim, the defendant

denied that the plaintiff had any interest in the subject
property; but joined no additional parties claiming any
interest, and made no allegations of a chain of titleo
(Record ppo 6-9) o
lSo

In its final order and judgment, the court

ordered that the plaintiff had no record interest in the
subject property on which to base a judgment quieting title
in the name of the plaintiff as against all other parties
to the action; and that the defendant was entitled to declaratory relief determining that the defendant's trust deed was
a good and valid lien against the subject propertyo
(Record ppo

550 and 551, and 535)0
ARGUMENT

POINT I: DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUJ.\'!MARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON A COUNTERCLAIM FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF WHERE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SET FORTH IN
THE ALLEGATIONS OF ITS COUNTERCLAIM ANY FACTS SUPPORTING ITS
CHAIN OF TITLE, AND FURTHER, WHERE THE DEF'ENDANT FAILED TO
JOIN ANY NECESSARY PARTY IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEFe
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On April 16, 1973, the defendant filed its Answer
and Counterclaim in this case.

In its answer and counter-

claim, the defendant merely alleged that it was the owner·
and holder of a trust deed and note on certain property;
and without anything further, prayed for declaratory judgment.,

(Record pp. 8)

This, in spite of the fact that the

defendant denied that the plaintiff had any interest in the
subject property, and further that the defendant joined no
party whom· it claimed had an inter.=st ..
The judgment of the lower court granted declaratory
relief despite these facts.

Indeed, the judgment stands for

the proposition that the defendant is entitled to a "deelaration" that it holds a good and valid lien upon real
property even though no person, firm, or corporation, having
any claim of interest in the property was ever made a party
to the action.
· The applicable statute on Declaratory relief provides
as follows:
"When declaratory relief is sought all
persons shall {emphasis supplied) be
mad~ parties who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the
declaration .... 11 Utah Code Annotated
78-33-11.
.
Appellant acknowledges that the declaratory relief
statute

is to be liberally construed.,

It is respectfully

submitted, however, that to grant declaratory relief respecting title to real property without joining any party
who may claim an interest, is not only an abuse of judicial
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discretion with respect to liberal construction, it is also
a denial of fundamental rights of due process.

Declaratory

relief is designed to promote judicial economy ~11t to grant
such relief without an opponent is a total wasteo
Appellant claimed to be the sole owner of the
s?bject property.
interest.

The Court found that appellant had no

Respondant, on the other hand, denied appellant's

title yet agreed to allow the court to dismiss out all
persons who may have claimed any interest (Record ppa 389,
394-395 para. 2).

Later, as will be argued hereafter,

respondant in its capacity as administrator of the estate of
appellant's deceased wife, disclaimed any interest in the
subject propertye
The second problem with the judgment of the
District Court granting declaratory relief in favor of the
respondents and against the appellant is that the pleadings
of the respondents are fatally defectiveo

To obtain

declaratory relief on a Trust Deed declaring that said Trust
Deed is a good and valid lien on real property, requires
that the parties seeking such declaratory relief allege a
chain of titleo

The respondent, in its answer and counter-

claim, and in its amended answer and counterclaim which it
subsequently withdrew, never alleged any chain of title
whatsoever.

Consequently, there is no allegation in pleadings

of the respondent whereby the Court could determine that the
Trust Deed, which respondent sought to have declared valid
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had any root of title whatsoever.

In fact,

if we are to

rely upon the allegations of respondent's answer to plaintiff s
1

complaint, the respondent affirmatively alleges that it
claims no title in the subject property.

In this respect,

appellant quotes from the answer of the respondent as
follows:
"In further answer to plaintiff's complaint, this defendant alleges that it
has and claims no right, title, interest
or estate in the property descrihAd in
plaintiff's complaint save and except as
the owner and holder of a certain tr~st
deed dated May 3, 1963, ... " (Record,
pp. 7 Paragraph (4).
The law of the State of Utah has been established
in a long line of cases commencing in 1924 and continuing
through the present date.

In the case of Campbell v.

Union Savings and Investment

C~

63 Utah 366, 226 Pacific

190 (1924), the court dealt with a factual situation sunstantially similar to the case at hand.

In that case, the

defendant, Union Savings and Investment Company had filed an
answer and counterclaim, and in their answer had specifically
denied plaintiff's title to the subject property and set up
by way of counterclaim, a claim that it had a mortgage in-

terest in the subject property.

Defendant's pleadings, how-

ever, failed to set forth any claim of ownership or interest
in the mortgaged premises, and the court stated as follows:
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"In the absence of any claim of ownership or interest by the defendant in the
mortgaged premises, we cannot conceive
how the mortgage constituted any lien
upon the property in question .. "
Campbell, 226 Pacific 190 at page 193
In the Campbell case, it should be noted, that
the defendant, Union-savings and Investment Company had
set forth in the allegations of its counterclaim that
it had obtained title from a party through whom the
plaintiff did not claim titles

In the instant case,

by way of contrast, Walker Bank and Trust Company, the
respondent ,has failed even :in that respect to allege tr.at
it even had a mortgagor or truster from whom it could
obtain a valid lien against the property.

(Record pp.

8 Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of counterclaim).
The Campbell case was subsequently cited in
Pender v. Bird, et al., 224 Pacific 2d 1057 (Utah 1950)
and the principals set forth in the Campbell case reaffirmed.,
The Pender case, however, was distinquished from the CamJ2.t>ell
case in that the claim of title in the Pender case was
based upon a chain of title which was defective.

In the

case at hand, as will be shown hereafter, it is clear
that the deed upon which the respondent would have the
Court base its title is a forgery, and therefore, void.
Both the Campbell case and the

Pende~

case have been sub-

sequently affirmed and followed by the case of Pleasant
Grove City vs. Crease, et al., Utah, 266 Pacific 2d 1019
(1954).,

In the Pleasant Grove case, the court stated
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as follows:
"In Pender v. Bird, 224 Pacific 2d 1057
a similar situation was presented.
The
plaintiff claimed title under a deed
which we held conveyed nothing.
The
defendant, Bird, claimed title under a
tax title which this court assumed to
be defective.
We held that the defendant
Bird being in possession under color of
title was entitled to a decree quieting
title against the plaintiff who had no
vestage of title.
Reliance was placed
upon Campbell v. Union Savings & Investment Co., 63 Utah 366 226 Pacific 190,
at 193, where this court held that the
title of plaintiff who was in possession
however defective it may be, 'is nevertheless ample to withstand the assaults
of the defendant so long as the defendant shows no right, title, or interest
whatever in the property' . 11
Pleasant
Grove City vs. Crease, 266 Pacific 2d 1019,
at Page 1020.
POINT II:
IS THE RESPONDENT, WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY-BARRED BY DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPLE
BY JUDGMENT OR THE "ONE ACTION RULE" FROM
ASSERTING AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WHICH THEY
HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCLAIMED ANY INTEREST IN, AND
li-/HERE THE COUNTERCLAIM OF WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY IN ITS CAPACITY AS THE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF UTAHNA P. BELNAP IN THIS ACTION HAS
BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
In considering the questions of res judicata,
estopple by judgment, and the

11

0ne Action Rule", appellant

feels that it would be helpful to set forth a recitation
of the facts upon which it claims the respondent is barred
from obtaining a judgment for declaratory relief in this
action.
1.

Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed the

special administrator of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap
on March 19, 1973,

(Record pp.565-657).
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2.,

Walker Bank & Trust Company was appointed the

administrator of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap on
August 24, 19760
3o

(Record, ppc 712).

As the special
A.

administrator~

Walker Bank & Trust Company petitioned

the court for authority to pay themselves all past due
payments due on the Trust Deed note which is the subject
of the counterclaim of the respondent,·Walker Bank & Trust
Company in its action for declaratory relief
pp

0

c

(Record

676- 678 ) •

B.

In their petition, Walker Bank & Trust

Company as the special administrator set forth the
fact that LeGrande Lo Belnap, appellant in this case,
disputed the claim of the estate that the estate had an
interest in the property which was given as security for
the subject trust deed and noteo

c.

On May 15, 1975, the court approved pay-

ments from the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap on the note
of Walker Bank & Trust Company and directed that all current payments be continued to be made by the estate to
Walker Bank & Trust Company until further order of the
court.

(Record pp. 674-75, 707).
D.

No order was ever entered by the Third

District Court in either of the probate actions, which
are part of this appeal terminating the authorization to
pay the payments on the note from the assets of the estate
of Utahna Petty Belnap.
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On January 31, 1976, Walker Bank &

E.

Trust Company as the special administrator filed its
"SECOND AND FINAL ACCOUNT OF WALKER SANK & TRUST COMPANY
AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF UTAHNA PETTY
BELNAP, DECEASED, OCTOSER l, 1974 THROUGH JANUARY 31,
1976c

(Record pp. 693).
F.

On January 31, 1976, Walker Bank & Trust

Company deleted the trust property from the estate with
·the statement

11

Court determined above property to be

that of LeGrande L. Belnap and not that of decedent.
Per Court order dtd 01/19/76.
- G.

11

(Record pp. 700).

Thereafter, Walker Bank & Trust as the

administrator of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap continued
to act as such until it was appointed as the administrator
in August, 1976.
H.

(Record pp. 712) c

Walker Bank & Trust Company as the

special administrator
April 16, 1973.

f~led

a counterclaim in this case on

(Record pp. 10-12) c

Said counterclaim

alleged that the estate of Utahna P. Belnap owned the
fee simple interest in the property which was given as
security for the trust deed note which is the subject of
respondent's petition for declaratory relief, and further
alleged in said counterclaim that LeGrande L. Belnap had
no interest in the property and sought the aid of the court
quieting title in the estate as against the interest of
LeGrande Belnap.

Said counterclaim of the special

administrator in this action, was dismissed with prejudice
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(Order, Judgment and Decree- dated 1 - la.7-76, Record
PPo 390-91) .

The respondent, Walker Bank & Trust Company
claims a lien against the subject property by virtue
of a Trust Deed and a Trust Deed Note signed by Utahna
Petty Belnap.

The estate of Utahna Belnap, with

Walker Bank & Trust as the special administrator disclaimed
any interest in the property, and consented that its
counterclaim in this action be dismissed with prejudice
(Record pp. 390-391).

The respondent was present at

the hearing when the estate and others were dismissed,
and when the counterclaim of the estate was dismissed
with prejudice.

The respondent as a corporation

never filed a claim against the e:3tate of Utahna Petty
Belnap even though notice to creditors was duly given
pursuant with statute.

(Record pp. 716-718).

This court is no doubt aware of the broad
(or misuse) of the Doctrines of Estopple.

use

One form of

estopple which seems to be applicable in the case at
hand is commonly referred to as judicial estopple.
It is a general rule that a party is bound by his
judicial declarations and may not contradict them in
a subsequent action or proceeding.

Tracy Loan and

Trust Company vs. Openshaw Investment Company, 102 Utah
509, 132 Pacific 2d 388.
(op. cit.)

In light of the Tracy case

it would seem that Walker Bank & Trust Company
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as the administrator of the estate of Utahna Petty
Belnap has in fact made judicial declarations by virtue
of the filing of its second and final account in that
estate, disclaiming any interest in the subject property,
and further by reason of the fact that it has voluntarily
consented to the dismissal of any claim which it may have
in the estate, which dismissal was granted by this court
in this case with prejudice.
Generally speaking, it has been said that estopple
is a bar which would preclude a person or entity from
denying anything to the contrary of that which has been
established as a fact by the acts of a judicial body, or
which has been established by his own acts or conduct
or lack thereof.

Kessinger

Ve

Anderson, 31 Washington

2d, 157, 196 Pacific 2d 289c
The respondent would have this court believe that
while it is acting in its corporate capacity (it has
no other capacity) that it cannot be bound for acts which
it

participat~d

in in a judicial forum in some other capacity.

Appellant respectfully submits that such a distinction is
clearly witpout forme

It is axiomatic that a corporation

is given its form by virtue of the lawc

Since Walker

Bank & Trust Company does not exist except in a corporate
form, obviously it cannot function except in its corporate
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formo

Whether it is acting on its own account, or

whether it is acting on the account of others, it is
the same capacity and the same "corpus"o

Since

Walker Bank & Trust Company can have only one personality, it is therefore submitted to this court under
the policy of Tracy Loan & Trust Company (opo cito)
that the respondent is bound by its own acts in another
capacity in the same District Court respecting the
subject property.
It is often said, however, that in order. to
enforce the principals of estopple against one party
in favor of another party, that it rnQst be shown that
the party seeking to enforce the principal of estopple
I'!lUSt

show that he has been harmedo

Since it is clear

that the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap has now been
finally settled under the hand of Walker Bank & Trust
Company as the administrator, and since it is further
clear that the statutory time for the plaintiff to file
any claim against the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap which
he may have by virtue of the claimed lien of Walker Bank

& Trust Company in this action has runp that the plaintiff
has clearly been prejudiced and has no other claim or
claimant against which he could assert a claim in damages
as a result of the judgment of the District Court in this
caseo

Since Walker Bank & Trust Company was party to the
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judicial action declaring that the estate of Utahna
Petty Belnap had no interest in the subject property,
and since the appellant in this matter is clearly prejudiced in that he is not now able to bring any claim
for damages against the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap
as a result of the claimed lien of the respondent, the
Doctrines of Estopple should clearly apply against the
defendant and in favor of the plaintiff in this case.
In the case of Wevant vs. Utah Savinas & Trust

Co~

54

Utah, 181, 182 Pacific 189, 9 ALR, 1119, the Supreme
Court held that where the statutory notice to creditors
had been given pursuant with the statutes applicable
to probate proceedings, all persons who were interested
in the estate are bound by all orders and decrees duly
entered in that particular case.

Such is the

case here, and the doctrines of the Wevant
case would not only apply to the appellant in this case,
but should also be made to apply to the respondent.
In addition to the Doctrines of Estopple, the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-37-1 are
also applicable against the respondent in this case.
That statute is widely recognized as the

"One Action

Rule" of the State of Utah, and provides that there shall
be one action for the foreclosure of any mortgage or
·Trust

Ile.~d

secured solely by mortgage or trust deed on

real property.

As set forth above, the special administrator
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of the estate of Walker Bank & Trust Company specifically
petitioned the court for authority to pay all past due
current and future payments on the trust deed note which
is the subject of respondents counterclaim.

In said

petition, the special administrator admitted that the
appellant in this case claimed to be the fee title owner
of the subject property.

In the same hearing where the

court approved the payment of all past due, present, and
future payments due on the trust deed note, from the
assets of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap, the special
administrator concurrently disclaimed any interest in
the propertya

At that point, it is clear that the

special admini$trator knew on behalf of itself and as
the administrator of the estate that its security had
been

impair~d,

and with the authority of the court to

continue making the payments on the note from the assets
of the estate until further order of the court, should
indeed have filed its claims against the estate as
provided by law, and receive the payments from the estate
until its trust deed note was satisfied in full.

In the

case of Baker National Bank v. Henderson (Montana) 445
Pacific 2d 574,

the Montana court held pursuant with

applicable Montana statutes that the failure of the bank
to file its creditors claim against the estate of a
decedent within a statutory period had the effect of
barring the claim, and not only was the remedy itself
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 18
destroyed, but the right was wiped out, and the claim .
thereupon ceased to existc
It

may

be asserted.

on

the

other hand that Walker Bank & Trust Company in its
petition for approval to make payments on the Trust
Deed note did in fact make a claim against the estate.
In that respect, since the court granted their

pet~tion,

and directed that payments be continued to be made on
the trust deed note until further order of the court,
and further since no order of the court was ever entered
denying them the right to make the payments, that Walker
Bank & Trust Company cannot now assert a lien against
this property where they had the authority to satisfy
their note from the assets of the estate.

If they did

in fact file such a claim by virtue of the filing of the
petition for approval to make payments, then they have
commenced an action against the estate of Utahna Petty
Belnap and they are precluded from bringing any other
action on the trust deed.
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 7837-1 et seq., clearly provide that a secured creditor,
upon determining that his security has been impaired
can in fact waive his security and proceed against the
general assets of the debtor.

Since the estate of Utahna

Petty Belnap has disclaimed any interest in the subject
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property, and since such

disclai~er

would obviously

result in the impairment of the security, the petition
of Walker Bank & Trust Company as the special administrator
for payment on the note from the general assets of the
estate is clearly the action·contemplated by Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-37-1.
It may be argued that the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated Section 75-3-803 (3) exempts respondent
from necessarily filing a claim as a creditor of the
estate of Utahna Petty Belnap since it

clai~s

or othei;- lien upon "property of the estateo

11

a mortgage
Since it

is now a matter of a judicial order and decree that the
subject property is not the property of Utahma Petty
Belnap, such a claimed exemption would failo
In addition to the foregoing principals of
estopple, and the provision of the mortgage foreclosure
statutes of the State of Utah, it should also be clear
that the determination of the Third District Court in
the matter of the probate of the estate of Utahna Petty
Belnap

.as well as the dismissal with prejudice of the

counterclaim of Walker Bank & Trust Company, in the
instant case constitutes a total bar to any further
action by Walker Bank & Trust Company on the principals
of res

judic~ta;

see Con v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250,

342 Pacific 2d page 7L

Such a doctrine applies to all
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persons who may be affected by judgments rendered in
the probate matter and in this case.

Since these

matters were consolidated by the Honorable Judge Hall, it
is clear that Walker Bank & Trust Company in its corporate capacity, as well as any other capacity was a
party both to this action and to the estate action.
In the final analysis, it seems that the District
Court has rendered a judgment in favor of Walker Bank &
Trust Company declaring that it has a good and valid
lien against real property situated in Salt Lake County,
but the judgments of the Third District Court in this
case, as well as the probate case would lead us but to
one cortclusion, to wit:

That appellant in this· case

has no interest in the subject property, and decedent
in the probate case has no interest in the subject property.

In deed, if no one

su~ject

property how is the respondent able to assert

~as

any interest in the

a claim based upon a trust deed note executed by one of
the parties who claims no interest in the property.
POINT III. CAN THE RESPONDENT, WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, BASE A CLAIM TO A SECURITY INTEREST IN REAL
PROPERTY UPON AN INSTRUMENT WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY AND
FACTUALLY FORGED.
It is undisputed that the signature of appellant's
mother on the deed dated November 10, 1952, is in fact
forged (Record Memorandum Decision page 540) , and that
the signature of appellant's father on said deed is
factually in dispute (Record pp. 14 and 15).
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The law in the State of Utah with respect to a
forged instrument is clearly set forth in the case of
Rasmussen vs. Olson, 583 Pacif.ic 2d 50,

(Utah 1978) .,

The Rasmussen case clearly held that the recording of
a forged deed gives no

~otice

to the world or to any-

body within in it of the contents thereof that such a
deed is void and even a bona fide purchaser from the
person who offered it takes nothing by it.
In the case of Mosley vs. Magnolia Petroleum
Company, 45 New Mexico 230, 114 Pacific 2d 740,

(1941)

the law with respect to forged instruments is exhaustively
treated and the Rasmussen case cites Mosley with
approval.,

In the Mosley case, it was factually shown

that one of the

p~rties

had fraudulently and surreptiously

obtained a deed from an escrow agent without the knowledge
or consent of the granter of the deed, and after obtaining
~he

same, altered the instrument with respect to the

nama of the grantee and delivered
grantee.,

it to the newly named

The Mosley court held that where the instrument

had been altered in that singular respect and further
because of the fact that there had been no delivery by
the original granter to the grantee named in the altered
instrument, that the deed,was void and that no bona fide
purchaser could rely upon tr.e same in a claim for title.
Here,

~he

deed of November 10, 1952, a deed upon

which the respondent apparently relied is not only void
because of the signature of Ida Belnap, but also because
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the same was never delivered by the purported

~ranter,

Henry Belnap to the purported grantee, Utahna P. Belnap.
(Record ppo 14-15) o
In the case of Salazar v. Manderfield 134 Pacific
2d, 544 (New Mexico 1943) , it was held that a deed
which is void in part because of a fraud with respect
to any single material aspect thereof will be void as to
the whole.

Appellants respectfully submits that the

Salazar case taken in connection with the Rasmussen
opinion (583 Pacific 2d 50)-and the Maqnolia opinion
(114 Pacific 2d 740) is the better law and the fact that
0

the instrument dated November 10, 1952 is an admitted
forgery, that the same is void, conveys no title, and
puts no one on notice of any interest contained therein.
Appellent cites the case of Walker Ban1<:

&

Trust,

Company v. Thorup, 7 Utah 2d 33, 317 Pacific 2d 952
(1957) in support of the assertion that Walker Bank &
Trust Company having both instruments in its possession
at the time of the recording of the instrument which is
admittedly forged,

is charged with, the responsibility to

know and determine the validity of all aspects of the
instrument upon which it intends to rely.
Bank v. Thorup case

In the Walker

the attorney who claimed to have

witnessed the signing of the questioned deeds, and to have
taken the decedent's acknowledgement testified in1great
detail .

There was also testimony to the effect that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 23
deceased had often stated after the date of the deed
that the deceased had given the respective tracts of
land to the respective defendants in the caseo

The

court ruled.however that there was nothing in the
testimony that would support a finding that the signature, although written by another was ever authorized
by the decedent or that the decedent ever adopted it
as her own,

Thus, in spite of the fact that the

decedent may have acted in such a way as to give
credence to the validity of the deed, since the same
were forged they had no force or effect, Walker Bank
Vo

Thoruo (supra at page 954).
This law is particularly applicable to appellants

caseo

Since there is no testimony whatsoever suggesting

that the deceased mother of appellant ever adopted or
ratified the forged signature, but on the contrary, there

is

testimony of Henry Belnap that he never signed his

wifes name to the instrument irr question, and that he
never appeared before the purported notary of his
signature and the forged signature of Ida Belnap, thus
making it impossible under the statutes of this State
for said ipstrument to be recorded or recordableo
(Record pp. 14 and 15).
It should also be noted that appellant's mother
had been deceased for more than one year when t~e forged
deed dated November 10, 1952 was delivered to Walker
Bank as a "new deed"

(Record pp. 531), when the.deed of
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August of 1951 was already in the possession of Walker
Bank & Trust Company,

(Record pp. 80-83).

Thus Walker

Bank had actual notice of the ownership interest of the
appellant at all times prior to recording the forged
deed in derogation of appellant's ownership, and this
notice continued until after the filing ?f this action
',\hen both orig·inal documents were discovered in the
files of Walker Bank & Trust Company.

(Deposition of

Stephen L. Goalen Record pp. 769 (Deposition
10) .

~~.

9 and

Since the initial deed which appellant had delivered

to Walker Bank was in their file and constituted actual
notice to them of the claimed interest which appellant
had in the property, the bank was charged with the duty
and responsibility to inquire into the validity of the
second deed.
In the case of Oailvie vs. Idaho Bank & Trust
Company, 582 Pacific 2d 215

(Idaho 1978) the court held

under the facts of that case that tl1ough
have protected itself from a forgery,

the bank could

it did not take the

care to do so; and that- the' bank cannot assert the
rights of a bona fide purchaser.
All of

t~ese

facts taken together with the fact

that Walker Bank & Trust Company as a special administrator
of the estate of Utahna Petty Belnap disclaimed any interest in the subject property should clearly establish
that the opinion and judgment of the Third District court
does
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majority opinion with respect to forged instrumentsa
In further support of appellant's contention
with respect to this matter, appellant cites the case
of Coast Mutual Buildina & Loan Association v. Security
Title Insurance and Guarantee CompallY..L.. 14 Cal. App. 2d
225, 57 Pacific 2d 1392 (1936).

In that case, the Cali-

fornia Court found itself facing a
similar to the facts in this case.

situat~~n

very

Therethe Court

held that where a party forged the owner's signature
to a deed and then obtained a loan which was secured
by a Trust Deed on the property, the actual owner
should prevail in a subsequent action to quiet title
to such property.

The District Court of Appeal

affirmed the lower court decision

t~at

the insurer

of a title policy, which policy had been issued to
the lenders simultaneously with the recordation of the
forged deed and the Trust Deed, could not defeat the
lender's action on the policy on the ground that the
owner's rights were not "shown by public records"
as provided in the policy.

In that lower court decision,

the California court held that the owner of the property
should prevail against the encumberancer of the property
who took such encumbrance as a result of a forged deed
even though such forged deed was properly recorded.
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Finally, since the first deed dated August 23,
1951, was duly executed and delivered (Record, pp. 14-15),
the second deed conveyed nothing, the fee having already
been delivered to appellant and accepted by him.

Delivery

and acceptance of a deed irrevocably passes title out
of the granter, and he cannot by any act subsequent
to the delivery invalidate, alter, or affect the first
conveyance, Valley State Bank v. Dean, 97 Colo. 151,
47 P. 2d 924 ..

(1934)

CONCLUSION
The Third District· Court, through the Declaratory
Judgment of Judge Bryant Croft has ignored the basic
rules of pleadings and the statute respecting declaratory
judgments.

Indeed it seems to have created a paradox.

The Honorable Judge Gordon

Hal~

has entered two consistent

orders to the effect that

appellant is the owner of the

property and the estate of appellant'-s deceased wife had no
interest (Record, pp 390-91; Record, pp 713-715).

The

judgment of Judge Bryant Croft, on the contrary says that
appellant's deceased wife has a good and yalid first lien
against the property (Record pp 550-555)

This is in

spite of the fact that the counterclaim of Walker

Ban~

&

Trust aE Special Administrator, which alleged _a chain of
title, was dismissed with prejudice; and the counterclaim
of Walker Bank & Trust in its corporate capacity, which
has not set up a chain of title or joined anv recessary
party, was allowed.
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Since the judgment of Judge Croft is inconsistent
with earlier rulings of the same court; since Respondent
has alleged no chain of title; since Respondant has joined
no party claiming an interest (the judgment ruled
that appellant had no interest and Respondant denied
appellants had an interest); and last of all, since the
only recorded deed is forged and conveys nothing, it is
mandatory that the Judgment be' reversed and judgment
entered in favor of Appellant quieting title as aginst
the Respondent; or at least that the matter be remanded
for trial to determine the proper root of titlec

Respectfully submitted

Kenneth L. Rothey
Attorney for Appellant
2275 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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